The coalition formation problem in an economy with externalities can be adequately modeled by using games in partition function form (PFF games), proposed by Thrall and Lucas. If we suppose that forming the grand coalition generates the largest total surplus, a central question is how to allocate the worth of the grand coalition to each player, i.e., how to find an adequate solution concept, taking into account the whole process of coalition formation. We propose in this paper the original concepts of scenario-value, process-value and coalition formation value value, which represent the average contribution of players in a scenario (a particular sequence of coalitions within a given coalition formation process), in a process (a sequence of partitions of the society), and in the whole (all processes being taken into account), respectively. We give an application to Cournot oligopoly, and two axiomatizations of the scenario-value.
Introduction
The coalition formation problem is one of the big issues of economics and game theory, both in cooperative and non-cooperative games. There are several attempts to analyze this problem. Many papers tried to find stable coalition structures in a cooperative game theoretic fashion (see, e.g., Ray and Vohra [12] , Diamantoudi and Xue [6] , and Funaki and Yamato [8] , or a dynamic process using a non-cooperative approach, as Bloch [3] ).
If we suppose that forming the grand coalition generates the largest total surplus, it is natural to assume that the grand coalition structure will eventually form after some negotiations. Then, the worth of the grand coalition has to be allocated to the individual players. The question is how to do that, taking into account the whole process of coalition formation.
In a coalition formation problem, it is important to consider situations with externalities. Typically, a coalition formation problem in an economy with externalities is related to public goods, public bads and common pool resource games. One of the best way to analyze it in game theory is to use games in partition function form (PFF games for short) introduced in Thrall and Lucas [13] (see also Funaki and Yamato [8] ). A partition function assigns a worth to each pair consisting of a coalition and a coalition structure which contains that coalition. Such pairs are called embedded coalitions. Games in partition function form are considered as a useful extension of classical TU games, since they well capture the externalities in an economy.
Then the above problem of allocation of the worth of the grand coalition amounts to defining a suitable solution concept or value for PFF games. For TU games, one of the most well-known solutions is the Shapley value. This solution concept is based on the marginal contribution of players when they enter the game one by one, considering all possible orders. There are already many attempts to define a modification of the Shapley value for PFF games, e.g., by Myerson [11] , Bolger [4] , Do and Norde [7] , Clippel and Serrano [5] , Albizuri et al. [1] , Macho-Stadler et al. [10] , etc. They proposed several new kinds of null player or dummy player axioms, and carrier axioms, which are extensions of the original axioms in TU games. Then the resulting formulas are averaging of marginal contributions of players when the players enter the game one by one. However, these approaches do not reflect properly the order of a pair of a coalition and the corresponding partition, which shows a process of coalition formation from singletons coalition structure to the grand coalition structure. Here a coalition formation process in a PFF game should depend on not only a coalition but also the corresponding coalition structure. This is given by a pair of a coalition and a partition containing the coalition and we call that pair an embedded coalition (coalition and coalition structure).
Mathematically the set of embedded coalitions has a structure much more complicated than the lattice structure of coalitions in a TU game, however, they share similar properties. One of the most interesting property is that all the maximal chains (paths from the minimal element to the maximal element) are of the same length. This means that a coalition formation process from the singleton coalition structure to the grand coalition structure in a PFF game has always the same number of steps. They clearly correspond to the marginal contribution of a player in this coalition formation process, which is a key concept to define the original Shapley value. Hence, roughly speaking, a permutation of players in a TU game corresponds to a maximal chain in the set of embedded coalitions for a PFF game.
Our idea is to take advantage of the structure of embedded coalitions endowed with a suitable ordering, and to follow as closely as possible the original idea of Shapley based on maximal chains. In this way we can propose a new value of a PFF game, which is rooted in the process of coalition formation. We also propose an axiomatization of this value, which is very close in spirit to the original one of Shapley, but very different from the previous approaches. This gives, for example, a proper null player property which is related to a coalition formation process.
An original feature of our approach is that we define three notions of value, which are in some sense embedded one into the others. The first one, called scenario-value, consider only one given maximal chain in the set of embedded coalitions, i.e., a given scenario of coalition formation, starting from a single player and arriving to the grand coalition. The second one, called process-value, consider all scenarios which follow the same fixed sequence of partitions of the society of players, starting from a society of individual players and arriving to the grand coalition. The third one, which corresponds to the usual notion of value, considers all possible processes (sequences of scenarios). According to the applicative context, the one which best makes sense can be used: in Section 5, we give an application to Cournot oligopoly, where the process-value is the most appropriate. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces embedded coalitions and their structure, Section 3 gives the definition of scenarios and processes, and the coalition formation value under its three forms is introduced in Section 4. After the application to Cournot oligopoly given in Section 5, two axiomatizations of the scenariovalue are given in Section 6, as well as an explicit expression of the coalition formation value. We end the paper with a comparison of our value with other values of PFF games.
Partitions and embedded coalitions
Let N := {1, 2, . . . , n} be the set of players. We denote by S, T, . . . , the subsets of N, and their cardinality by s, t, . . .. A subset of N is called a coalition. A partition π := {S 1 , . . . , S k } is a collection of disjoint nonempty coalitions S 1 , . . . , S k with ∪ k l=1 S l = N. Subsets S 1 , . . . , S k are called blocks of π. We denote by Π(N) or Π(n) the set of all possible partitions of N. A partition shows the structure of sub-groups in the player set, then it is usually called a coalition structure. A partition with k blocks is called a k-partition. A natural ordering of partitions is given by the notion of "coarsening" or "refinement", like an ordering of subsets. Taking π, π ′ partitions in Π(N), we say that π is a refinement of π ′ or π ′ is a coarsening of π, denoted by π ≤ π ′ , if any block of π is contained in a block of π ′ (or equivalently, every block of π ′ fully decomposes into blocks of π). Then (Π(N), ≤) is a lattice, called the partition lattice. With this ordering, the bottom element of the lattice is the finest partition π ⊥ := {{1}, . . . , {n}} called the singletons coalition structure, while the top element is the coarsest partition π ⊤ := {N} called the grand coalition structure. An example with n = 4 is given below. An embedded coalition is a pair (S, π), where S is a coalition such that S ∈ 2 N \ {∅}, and π is a coalition structure such that S ∈ π. We also call S the base coalition of (S, π). We denote by C(N) (or by C(n)) the set of embedded coalition on N. For the sake of concision, we often denote by Sπ the embedded coalition (S, π), and omit braces and commas for subsets (example for n = 3: 12{12, 3} instead of ({1, 2}, {{1, 2}, {3}})). Remark that C(N) is a proper subset of 2 N × Π(N). We propose the following order relation on embedded coalition, which is merely the product order on 2 N × Π(N):
Evidently, the top element of this ordered set is (N, π ⊤ ) (denoted more simply by N{N} according to our conventions). However, due to the fact that the empty set is not allowed in (S, π), there is no bottom element in the ordered structure (C(N), ⊑). Indeed, all elements of the form ({i}, π ⊥ ) are minimal elements (i.e., there is no smaller element than them). For mathematical convenience, we introduce an artificial bottom element ⊥ to C(N) (it could be considered as (∅, π ⊥ )), and denote C(N) ⊥ := C(N) ∪ {⊥}. We give as illustration the partially ordered set (C(N) ⊥ , ⊑) with n = 3 ( Fig. 1) . Following the usual interpretation, the payoff for coalition S depends on the situation of the outsiders, depicted by the partition π, which represents the externalities in an economy.
To be meaningful, we assume that forming the grand coalition generates the largest total surplus, i.e., v(N{N}) ≥ S∈π v(S, π), for all π ∈ Π(N). Hence, we consider economic environments where doing so is the best for the society and the total surplus v(N{N}) is distributed among the players in the society.
We recall that in a partially ordered set (P, ≤) with a bottom element ⊥ and a top element ⊤, a chain from ⊥ to ⊤ is a totally ordered sequence of elements of P including ⊥, ⊤. The chain is maximal if no other chain can contain it (equivalently, if between two consecutive elements x i , x i+1 of the sequence, there is no element x ∈ P such that x i < x < x i+1 ). If no ambiguity occurs, we say maximal chain instead of maximal chain from ⊥ to ⊤. The set of maximal chains in P is denoted by C(P ). The length of a maximal chain is the number of elements of the sequence minus 1. If all maximal chains have same length, this length is the height of the partially ordered set. In Fig. 1 , the sequence ⊥, 1{1, 2, 3}, 1{1, 23}, 123{123} is a maximal chain, and there are 9 maximal chains in total, all of length 3, hence the height of (C(123) ⊥ , ⊑) is 3. Concerning the partition lattice Π(N), it is easy to see that its height is n − 1. In [9] , it is proved that (C(N) ⊥ , ⊑) is a lattice, whose maximal chains have all the same length n, hence the height of this lattice is n. The combinatorial complexity of (C(N) ⊥ , ⊑) is far beyond the complexity of the Boolean lattice of coalitions in a TU game (for n players, there are 2 n coalitions and n! maximal chains), as illustrated by the following facts [9] :
• The total number of elements is n k=1 kS n,k + 1, where S n,k is the Stirling number of second kind. For simplicity, we put c := |C(C(n) ⊥ )| and it is shown in [9] that |C(Π(n))| = c n .
Processes and scenarios
We consider a coalition formation process as a sequence of embedded coalitions.
Definition 2. (i)
A coalition formation process P is any maximal chain in Π(n), i.e., a sequence of partitions starting from π ⊥ (singleton coalition structure) and ending at {N} (the grand coalition). The set of processes is C(Π(n)) =: P.
(ii) A scenario S in a process P is any maximal chain in C(n) ⊥ so that the sequence of partitions corresponds to P (notation: S ← P). The set of all scenarios, considering all processes, is therefore C(C(n) ⊥ ), denoted by S for simplicity. If player i belongs to all the base coalitions in scenario S, it may be called a scenario for player i.
For a given process P, there are n scenarios S i , i ∈ N, scenario S i tracking the history of player i in the coalition formation process. Note that a given scenario belongs to a unique process. For example, in a 3 persons game with N = {1, 2, 3}, we have three processes:
In process P 2 , first players 1 and 3 merge, then coalitions 13 and 2 merge and form the grand coalition. A process describes how exactly the coalition structure evolves step by step, by a process of coalition formation.
Each coalition process has three scenarios. In the above example, process P 2 has the following three scenarios:
Scenario S i for player i describes what happens to player i in the process P 2 of a coalition formation in view of player i or in position of player i. In S 1 , player 1 first merges with player 3 at the singletons coalition structure, then this base coalition 13 containing player 1 merges with player 2 and becomes the grand coalition structure. Different views of players correspond to different scenarios.
In a scenario S, some elements play a special role. We consider those elements Sπ such that in the sequence of elements of S from bottom to top, Sπ is the last element with base coalition S. They are called terminal elements. Specifically, let us denote S by
Then the terminal elements are S i π i,m i , i = 1, . . . , k. We denote by F(S) this family of elements. A terminal element is an embedded coalition such that the base coalition of the embedded coalition changes at the next step in the scenario. Example 1. We consider 4 players and the following process P:
and the four different scenarios in P where terminal elements are in bold:
Scenario S 1 for player 1 tells that player 1 first merges with player 3, then this coalition remains in the next step, and finally base coalition 13 merges with coalition 24, and becomes the grand coalition. Note that in the second step, only coalition 24 which is irrelevant to player 1, is formed. Thus the embedded coalition 13{13, 2, 4} is not a terminal element. In other words, if not terminal elements, base coalitions containing player 1 do not change. Scenario S 4 for 4 describes player 4 first does not merge with any player but players 1 and 3 merge, then player 4 merges with player 2, and base coalition 24 merges with coalition 13. We only take into account a terminal embedded coalition to define the values in this paper. 
Definition of the coalition formation value
In this section we motivate our definition of the value for PFF games. Since it is based on an interpretation in terms of coalition formation, and due to its mathematical definition close to the classical Shapley value, we call it the Shapley coalition formation value. Basically, a value represents the average contribution of players for all the scenarios in a game, which is similar to the average contribution of players for all the sequence to enter a game, defining the original Shapley value in TU game.
In a given scenario S i belonging to process P, the contribution of player j, j ∈ N, is the marginal worth of j in the scenario. It is somehow player j's contribution in process P in i's viewpoint.
However, this notion is not so obvious to define because, unlike TU games, it is not true that in each step of the scenario a single player merges with a base coalition in the game. Here the merging player with a base coalition plays the role of an entering player into a game in a sequence for TU games. Let us consider scenario S 1 for player 1 in Example 1:
There are 4 steps in this scenario and four situations arise:
(i) In the first step, player 1, the main actor/actress of the scenario, enters the game and becomes a singleton embedded coalition. In this case, the marginal worth goes to the entering player 1. Note that this embedded coalition is a terminal element.
If it is not, this embedded coalition is not taken into account and player 1 has to wait for a terminal element to get payoff.
(ii) In the second step, a single player merges to form base coalition 13. Like for TU games, the marginal worth goes to the merging player 3 with base coalition 1. However since the resulting embedded coalition is not a terminal element, player 3 has to wait to get the marginal worth.
(iii) In the third step, no player merges with the base coalition. In this case, no change occurs for the base coalition. However since the resulting embedded coalition is a terminal element, the marginal worth for player 3 is given.
(iv) In the fourth step, more than one player merge together with the base coalition.
In this case, we employ one of the simplest principle, which is equal division. This induces that the marginal worth is equally divided among the merging players with the base coalition.
Applying this method to the above scenario S 1 , we obtain:
(ii) contribution of player 2:
(iv) contribution of player 4:
By the same considerations, for scenario S 2 , we obtain:
(i) contribution of player 1:
(iii) contribution of player 3:
Based on the above considerations, we can define the contribution of a player in a scenario.
Definition 3. The contribution of player i in a given scenario S is given by
where Sπ is the last element where i is not present (note that Sπ ∈ F(S)), and S ′ π ′ is the next terminal element (see Figure 3 ). (ii) A process-value is a mapping ψ : PG → R n×|P| . Components of ψ(v) are denoted by ψ P i (v) for process P and player i. If there is no confusion, we also call each component ψ P i (v) a process-value. Any scenario-value ψ induces a process-value (denoted with some abuse by the same letter ψ) by:
The Shapley process-value is induced by the Shapley scenario-value.
(iii) A value is a mapping ψ : PG → R n . Components of ψ(v) are denoted by ψ i (v) for player i. Any scenario-value or process-value ψ induces a value by:
The Shapley coalition formation value of v is induced by the Shapley process-(and/or scenario-) value.
It is important to notice that a scenario-value (resp., process-value) determines all the values of players for all scenarios (resp., processes) simultaneously.
From the definition, a scenario-value (resp., a process-value) uniquely induces a processvalue and a value (resp., a value), but the converse is not true. In general, values are not necessarily expressed as sums of scenario-values (ex. just consider ψ i (v) := ψ
and several scenario-values may induce the same value. We say that a value ψ admits a representation (or is representable) by a scenario-value φ ′ if φ ′ induces φ. Of course, the same remark applies to process-values: one can have values representable by a processvalue, and process-values representable by a scenario-value. Note that the representation is not unique in general. Remark 1. Our definition of the scenario-value as an (n × c)-dimensional vector (hence a sharing among all players for any scenario) can be equivalently written as c scenariovalues considered as n-dimensional vectors, one for each possible scenario. The rest of the paper would remain valid up to some rewriting, however at the cost of a less elegant and clear presentation. The same remark applies to the process-value.
(iv) With some abuse, we say that a scenario-value is efficient (E) if the induced value is efficient, that is,
The same convention applies to process-efficiency.
Be careful that it makes no sense to say that a value representable by a scenario-value is scenario-efficient, since in general the representation is not unique, and all representation need not be scenario-efficient. However, if a value (resp. process-value) is representable by a scenario-value which is scenario-efficient, then the value is efficient (resp. the processvalue is process-efficient). Proposition 1. The Shapley scenario-value is scenario-efficient. Hence, it is processefficient and efficient as well.
Proof. Consider a scenario S, written as
For any S j and any i ∈ S j \ S j−1 , we have
Hence
with S 0 := ∅ and S k+1 := N.
Example 3. This example gives the Shapley coalition formation value for three persons games. This makes the difference from other values for PFF games clear. In the three persons case, we have 3 processes and 9 scenarios in total. Then we have the formula of the Shapley coalition formation value for three persons games (i, j, k denote any three different players):
This is different from the other values of PFF games. One of the most important difference appears when we apply this formula to TU games. If we consider a PFF game with no externality, that is, v(Sπ) = v(Sπ ′ ) for any π and π ′ with π ∋ S, π ′ ∋ S, it naturally corresponds to a TU game. We can define the TU gamev from the PFF game v by:v (S) := v(Sπ) for any S ∈ 2 N , any π ∋ S.
Then we have a value formula for a TU game from the Shapley coalition formation value in three person games,
This is completely different from the original Shapley value. Player i gets less share ofv(ij),v(ik), and −v(jk) than s/he gets in the original Shapley value. However, most of the proposed values for PFF games coincide with the original Shapley value of TU games. This shows the fundamental difference between our value, which is rooted into the idea of coalition formation process, and the other ones, which are more in the classical coalitional view of games.
Coalition formation process in Cournot oligopoly
In this section, we give an application of the values we defined to a coalition formation process in Cournot oligopoly.
We consider a symmetric case where the worth of the embedded coalitions depends only on the number of blocks of the partition, i.e., v(Sπ) = v k , where π = {S, S 2 , . . . , S k }. Symmetric Cournot oligopoly games and symmetric common pool resource games satisfy this property (see Funaki and Yamato [8] ). Under this condition, the Shapley coalition formation value is always the equal division of v(N{N}) because of the symmetry of v. Hence this value is of no interest, and we consider the Shapley process-value instead. In other words, to see the effect of a coalition process, a symmetric game is more adequate, because the difference of payoff among players arises from the asymmetry of the coalition formation process.
Consider a 4-person game with N = {1, 2, 3, 4}, and two typical coalition formation processes P and P ′ , defined as follows.
Coalition formation process P represents a situation where all players enter the largest coalition one by one, while coalition formation process P ′ represents somehow a symmetric coalition formation process.
The Shapley process-values of the processes P and P ′ are given by
These
. This is because in the first step of coalition formation process P, the roles of players 1 and 2 are very similar since both are first players to enter, and v 4 has no influence in that case.
This result can be extended to the general case. First we give the Shapley processvalue for the following coalition formation process P in an n-person game.
P : {1, 2, 3, . . . , n} → {12, 3, . . . , n} → {123, . . . , n} → · · · → {N}
The value becomes
for k = 2, . . . , n − 1, and
Consider next the case of n = 2 m and a process P ′ defined by
The Shapley process-value for process P ′ is given by φ
for k = 1, . . . , n, which shows that everyone has a perfectly symmetric role in this process. This can be explained as follows. Every single player makes a two-person coalition when making the first coalition. Next, two two-person coalitions merge into 4-person coalitions, and so on. In each step, both coalitions have the same power. Then it is natural that finally each player has an equal contribution.
Next we apply this to a Cournot oligopoly with linear demand and constant average costs. We assume that the efficient coalition {N} is formed. Then we evaluate each firm's contribution depending on the coalition formation process.
Let us consider the following Cournot model with n identical firms. Let x i be firm i's output (i = 1, . . . , n). The inverse demand function is given by p = a − n i=1 x i , and the total cost function of firm i is cx i , where a > c > 0. Given a coalition structure π = {S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S k }, we assume that each coalition S j is a player who chooses the total output level of its firms to maximize the sum of their profits, given the output levels of other coalitions. Then it is easy to check that the total profit of each coalition S j at a unique Nash equilibrium is given by (a−c) 2 (k+1) 2 . Without loss of generality, we assume that a − c = 1. This gives
and implies
Moreover it holds that for k = 2, . . . , n − 1,
is a concave decreasing function, the Shapley process-value φ P k of player k satisfies φ
This shows that when players enter the game one by one, the later a player joins the current coalition, the more the contribution of this player in Cournot oligopoly. This is natural because
However the original Shapley value of TU games cannot be used to analyze this situation because of the existence of externalities in Cournot oligopoly. Moreover, no value for PFF games can be used, because they will all lead to an equal division of v 1 among players, and give no information on particular processes.
Turning to the symmetric coalition formation process P ′ , we see that it induces a symmetric contribution of the players.
For the sake of completeness, we give numerical results for the 4-person case. The latter player gets more profit in process P. Note that the contribution of the last player in process P is more than one half. Symmetric values for PFF games give the equal division 1 4 (.25, .25, .25, .25) and do not say anything about a coalition formation process. However our Shapley processvalue shows the difference between two processes P and P ′ . Process P ′ is more egalitarian than process P. Even in a symmetric oligopoly, the coalition formation process matters a lot.
Axiomatizations
We give in this section two axiomatizations of the Shapley scenario-value. Since it induces the Shapley process-value and the Shapley coalition formation value, we have also indirectly in some sense axiomatizations for them. However, since infinitely many scenariovalues can induce the Shapley coalition formation value, our axiomatizations are therefore stronger than necessary to axiomatize the Shapley coalition formation value. Note also that since the ranges are different for the scenario-value, the process-value and the value, axioms are dedicated to one type of value and cannot always be easily transposed for another type. We believe however that axioms written for the scenario-value are the most natural and close to the intuition of coalition formation.
A scenario-value satisfies linearity (L) if it is linear on the set of PFF-games. We define similarly linearity for process-values and values.
We do not give different names for these three axioms, since their domains are different and should be clear from the context. Proposition 2. If ψ is a linear scenario-value, then for all v ∈ PG(N)
for some real constants γ i S,Sπ (and similarly for a linear process-value, with constants γ i P,Sπ , and for a linear value, with constants γ i Sπ ). Proof. As usual, consider the identity PFF-games e Sπ (S ′ π ′ ) := 1 iff Sπ = S ′ π ′ and 0 else, for all Sπ ∈ C(n). Then linearity implies, for e.g. a scenario-value:
hence the result, letting ψ (ii) If a scenario-value is linear, then clearly its induced value is linear too. The converse is not true in general. Take simply n = 2 and the two scenarios S 1 , S 2 . Define for i = 1, 2:
Then clearly the scenario-value is not linear but the induced value is.
Definition 6. Let us consider i ∈ N, a scenario S, and denote by Sπ the last element in S not containing i, and S ′ π ′ its successor in F(S), as in Figure 3 . Player i is null in scenario S for v if v(Sπ) = v(S ′ π ′ ). Player i is null for v if i is null for every scenario S.
Scenario Null axiom (SN)
Similarly as for linearity, if i is null for every scenario S, then ψ i (v) = 0 (null axiom for the induced value), but the converse does not hold, that is, if ψ i (v) = 0 holds, then i is not necessary null in every scenario.
Proposition 3. Notation: for given i ∈ N and scenario S := {∅π ⊥ , S 1 π 1 , . . . , S n π n = N{N}}, Sπ and S ′ π ′ above are denoted respectively by S k π k and S l π l . Under (L) and (SN), for every scenario S, every player i, the scenario-value reads
Proof. Take any scenario S with the above notation. Define v(S j π j ) = 1 for j = k, l, and 0 otherwise. Then i is null for v in S. Then by (SN) we get γ
The following is a modification of a usual symmetry axiom.
Symmetry axiom for the scenario-value (SS): For any i ∈ N, any S ∈ S, and any permutation σ on N, it holds
with σ(S), σ(S, π) defined naturally as follows: σ(S, π) = (σ(S), σ(π)), where
Proposition 4. Under (L) and (SS), the scenario-value takes the form
for any scenario S and player i, where τ (S) is the sequence s 1 , . . . , s n of cardinalities of coalitions in S := {⊥, S 1 π 1 , . . . , S n π n }, and ρ(π) is the sequence of the cardinality of blocks of π, arranged in nondecreasing order.
Example 4. Taking the process P of Example 2, the leftmost scenario S and Sπ = 12{12, 34, 5}, we have τ (S) = 1, 2, 2, 3, 5 and ρ(π) = 1, 2, 2.
Proof. From (L), any scenario-value has the following form, for any i ∈ N, S ∈ S
Hence, for any permutation σ on N:
By (SS), we deduce that γ
, for all i ∈ N, all S ∈ S, all Sπ ∈ C(n), and all permutations σ. Suppose S ∋ i. Then for any permutation σ leaving i invariant (i.e., σ(i) = i), we deduce that γ i S,Sπ = γ i σ(S),σ(Sπ) , so that these coefficients depend only on the cardinality of subsets in S, of the cardinality of S, and of the cardinality of blocks of partition π. Hence we can define γ i τ (S),s,ρ(π) := γ i S,Sπ , for all i ∈ N, all Sπ such that S ∋ i, and all S ∈ S, where τ (S) is the nondecreasing sequence of the cardinality of subsets in S, and ρ(π) the nondecreasing sequence of the cardinality of blocks of π. Remark that s is superfluous, since s is the k-th number in the sequence τ (S), with k the number of blocks of π (length of the sequence of ρ(π)).
Take now any permutation σ such that σ(i) = i. We obtain that 
In summary, we have under (L), (SN), and (SS):
for every scenario S and every player i ∈ N.
Theorem 1. The Shapley scenario-value is the unique scenario-value satisfying (L), (SN), (SS), and (SE).
Proof. The fact that the Shapley scenario-value satisfies (L), (SN), (SS) and (SE) is easy to check. Indeed, it has the form (2) with γ τ (S),ρ(π l ) = 1 |S l \S k | , and we have proved in Proposition 1 that it satisfies (SE).
Conversely, let S = {∅π
From (L), (SN), (SS), and (2) we get:
From the (SE) axiom, we deduce the following linear system of k + 1 equations and k + 1 unknowns:
Evidently the system is nonsingular, since from the last equation γ τ (S),n is obtained, then substituting it into the last but one, we get γ τ (S),ρ(π k,m k ) and so on. Knowing that the coefficients of the Shapley scenario-value are solutions of the system, it is the unique solution.
The Shapley scenario-value is fully characterized by these axioms, which are very similar to the classical axioms of the Shapley value for TU games. However, every axiom is restricted to a single scenario in a coalition formation process, therefore in some sense we have a local axiomatization. Imposing that each scenario must satisfy these axioms may appear as a strong condition. Our next axiomatization avoids this by using efficiency, the weaker and most global form of effiency, instead of the strong and local scenario-efficiency. We will see that a fifth axiom is then necessary to characterize the scenario-value.
We now introduce an axiom related to the temporal nature of the coalition formation process. In system theory, where the state of a system evolves with time, fundamental concepts are the fact that the state at time t depends on the state at time t − 1, but regardless of times t − 2, etc., and that the evolution of states does not depend on the time origin. In Markov processes, these are known as the Markov property, and ergodicity. We will follow here the same philosophy. Translated into the language of coalition formation, the Markov property means that for a scenario S and a given Sπ ∈ F(S), only its predecessor S − π − in F(S) matters, not the whole scenario. Concerning ergodicity, time is here simply the step number in the scenario, i.e., exactly the number of blocks of π. Hence ergodicity means that the rank of the current coalition (or the number of blocks of the current partition) should not matter.
Markovian and Ergodic axiom (ME): Let us consider two coalitions S, S
− , such that S − ⊂ S, and a game v S,S − such that v S,S − (Sπ) = 1 and
A scenario-value ψ satisfies (ME) if, for all
Note that the Markovian property becomes apparent when one restricts to fixed partitions π, π − .
Proposition 5. Under (L), (SN), (SS) and (ME), we have, for any scenario S, any Sπ ∈ F(S) and its predecessor
for all i ∈ S \ S − . If S is a singleton, γ s,s − is denoted by γ 1,0 .
Proof. Under (L), (SN) and (SS)
π) can be any sequence from 1, 1, . . . , 1, s (the longest) to s, n − s (the shortest). Hence γ τ (S),ρ(π) does not depend on ρ(π) but only on s. Concerning the scenario, any scenario passing through S and S − , provided S and S − are neighbours in F(S), is allowed. Hence τ (S) has the form . . . , s − , s, s, . . . , s k times , s ′ , . . ., with k = 0, 1, . . ., the total length of the sequence being n, and any sequence of that type is produced by some S defined as above. Consequently, the dependency to τ (S) is reduced to the dependency to s, s − .
Theorem 2. The Shapley scenario-value is the unique scenario-value satisfying (L), (SN), (SS), (E) and (ME).
Proof. Again, the Shapley-scenario-value clearly satisfies these axioms. Conversely, let us assume that the scenario-value satisfies the five axioms, and let us compute i∈N S∈S ψ
we get a system of linear equations, one per element Sπ. We know that there exists at least one solution to this system, since our Shapley scenario-value satisfies the five axioms. Our task will be to prove that this is the only solution. To this aim, we will prove that there are at least as many equations as variables, and that there exists a subsystem which can be made triangular.
First, we determine the form of the equation for element Sπ := S{S, S 2 , . . . , S k }, assuming Sπ is any element different from N{N} and S is not a singleton. From (3), there is a negative contribution for v(Sπ) with coefficient −γ s + ,s for all S + π + such that (ii) all sub-scenarios from S ∪ S j π S∪S j to S ∪ S j π + , for all possible π + coarser than π S∪S j and containing S ∪ S j ; (iii) for a given π + , all sub-scenarios from
Hence the number of such scenarios is
where the notation C([⊥, Sπ]) stands for the set of maximal chains from ⊥ to Sπ, and so on (for the second term, since the coalition is always S + , we can omit it). Although this number seems difficult to compute (!), it depends ultimately only on k, s, s 2 , . . . s k , hence on the number of blocks of π and their cardinality. Indeed, the following results are shown in [9] .
• Consider two distincts elements π, π ′ ∈ Π(n), with π ′ < π. Then
. . , S 1l 1 , S 21 , . . . , S 2l 2 , . . . , S kl k }, with {S i1 , . . . , S il i } a partition of S i , i = 1, . . . , k, and
• Let Sπ be an embedded coalition, with π := {S, S 2 . . . , S k }. The number of maximal chains from ⊥ to Sπ is
• Let Sπ be an embedded coalition, with π := {S, S 2 . . . , S k }. The number of maximal chains from Sπ to N{N} is
We deduce from this: Similarly, there is a positive contribution for v(Sπ) with coefficient γ s,s − for all
, and all scenarios S passing through elements Sπ and S − π − , so that Sπ, S − π − ∈ F(S). Hence, any scenario of the following form, with S − π − defined as above
, . . . , Sπ, S ∪ S j π S∪S j , . . . , N{N}, j = 2, . . . , k will lead to a positive contribution with coefficient γ s,s − . The number of such scenarios is, reasoning as above,
Again, this number depends only on s − , the number of blocks of π and their cardinality. In summary, the equation for Sπ = N{N} is
Let us address briefly the case of singletons and N. If S = {i}, the first term is replaced by α 1,0,π γ 1,0 , with
If S = N, the second term does not exist. In summary:
From the above considerations, equations for Sπ and S ′ π ′ will be identical if and only if s = s ′ , and π and π ′ are of the same type (same number of blocks and same cardinality of blocks). Hence, the number of different equations is the number of integer partitions of n − s, denoted by p(n − s), for s = 1, . . . , n (for n = s, there is only one equation, which is (4)). For example, the numbers of integer partitions of 1, 2, 3, 4 are respectively 1, 2, 3, 5. Hence, for n = 2, 3, 4, 5 we have respectively 2, 4, 7, and 12 different equations.
The number of variables γ s,s ′ is much easier to compute. For s = 1, there is only one variable, namely γ 1,0 . For 1 < s ≤ n fixed, s ′ varies from 1 to s − 1. Hence the total number of variables is:
This gives for n = 2, 3, 4, 5 players, 2, 4, 7, 11 variables. It is easy to see that this number is less or equal than the number of equations. Indeed, for large n, the following formula is known:
which is clearly exponential (see Andrews [2] ). It remains to find a subsystem of equations which can be made triangular. Let us order the variables as follows: γ 1,0 , γ 2,1 , γ 3,1 , γ 3,2 , γ 4,1 , . . .. For each variable γ s ′ ,s , except for γ 1,0 , let us find an equation using only variables up to γ s ′ ,s . It suffices to take the equation for Sπ such that the largest block of π \ {S} is of size s ′ − s. Doing so for all γ s ′ ,s , we form a subsystem. If in this subsystem, we put for each equation γ 1,0 on the right side, the subsystem becomes triangular. So it has a unique solution in terms of γ 1,0 , which can be determined by substituting all variables in the equation corresponding to Sπ = N{N}. This proves the uniqueness of the solution.
A small change from (SE) to (E) implies a large difference. Here the basic ingredients of a value, scenario-values, are characterized by the efficiency of the induced value. In this sense this theorem offers a bridge to characterize the Shapley coalition formation value.
We end this section by providing an explicit expression of the Shapley coalition formation value. We consider the identity games e T σ for any T σ ∈ C(N) (see proof of Prop. 2). We have for any game v in PG(N), v = T σ∈C(N ) v(T σ)e T σ . Since the Shapley scenario-value is linear, so is the Shapley value. Hence, for any game v in PG(N),
It remains to compute φ i (e T σ ) for all i ∈ N and all T σ ∈ C(N).
A first important thing is to notice that symmetry (SS) implies φ i (e T σ ) = φ j (e T σ ) for all i, j ∈ T . Indeed, consider any permutation τ such that τ (T ) = T , and τ is the identity on N \ T . Then, for any i ∈ T ,
.
From this and efficiency we immediately have:
Let us consider a given T σ ∈ C(N), T σ = N{N}, and consider any i ∈ T . Let us put for convenience σ = {T, T 2 , . . . , T k } and consider that i ∈ T 2 . A scenario S induces φ 
From this we deduce
hence, by efficiency we get:
which gives by symmetry:
Hence for any game v, we obtain:
where it is assumed in the second term that i ∈ T 2 , the second block of σ, and k stands for the number of blocks of σ. An equivalent expression, although less computationally efficient, is:
with σ T ∪i the partition obtained from σ by moving i ∈ T 2 to T .
Concluding Remarks.
As we discussed in a three person example (Example 3), the Shapley coalition formation value is completely different from other values of PFF games. However it is still important to compare axioms. Since we gave axiomatizations of the Shapley scenario-value, we compare its axiom system (L), (SN), (SS) and (SE) of Proposition 5 with the axioms for other values of PFF games. They are close to the axiomatization of the original Shapley value for TU games.
Myerson's value of a PFF game (Myerson [11] ) is uniquely determined by the following three axioms: (S: symmetry) for any permutation σ, ψ i (v) = ψ σi (σv), (ADD: additivity) for any two games v, w, ψ(v + w) = ψ(v) + ψ(w), and (CAR: carrier) if T is a carrier, that is, v(T π) = v(T ∩ S, π ∧ {T, N \ T }) ∀Sπ ∈ C(N), then k∈T ψ k (v) = v(N, {N}). (ADD) is a bit weaker but almost the same as (L). (CAR) is an extension of that in TU games, which is equivalent to the null axiom and the efficiency for the original Shapley value. In this sense it is a direct generalization of an axiom system for the original Shapley value. The most different axiom from our axiomatization of our scenario-value is (CAR). It is important to mention that the Myerson's value of a PFF game in three person game has the opposite effect for v(i{i, j, k}) from other values, that is, if v(i{i, j, k}) increases, the Myerson's value of player i decreases.
Bolger's value (Bolger [4] ) of a PFF game is uniquely determined by the following five axioms: (S),(L), (E: efficiency), (B-null) if j is a null player, that is, v(Sπ) = v(S \ . This value is also characterized by Albizuri et al. [1] . Clearly it utilizes the full information given by the PFF game.
Our scenario-value is different from any of the values above, and does not satisfy the above null axioms. What is interesting is to have a clear view of the difference by looking at the underlying structures. However, in the above papers, there is no explicit mention of some order on embedded coalitions. To our opinion, the underlying structure is implicitly suggested by the null axioms. In the case of TU games, the null axiom is based on the difference between the worths of S and S \ i, assuming S ∋ i. These elements are "neighbors" in the lattice (2 N , ⊆). In the PFF case, our scenario null axiom is defined along a maximal chain of C(N) ⊥ . The B-null axiom takes the difference of worth between S{S, S 2 , . . . , S k } and S \ i{S \ i, S 2 ∪ i, . . . , S k }, for S ∋ i. In C(N) ⊥ , these elements are not neighbors because they are on the same level. To recover them as neighbors, one possibility is the following: take the Boolean lattice (2 N , ⊆). Duplicate each element S as many times there are different possible coalition structures containing S, and indicate these coalition structures. Put all possible links between duplicates of an element S and duplicates of an element T if and only if these elements are linked in the Boolean lattice. Doing so, the B-nullity condition appears for neighbors elements. This structure also explains well the average approach: it can almost be seen on the picture. For illustration, we give C(N) and the structure induced by B-nullity for n = 3. 
